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INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro and his army ousted Cuban
dictator Fulgencio Batista from the island of Cuba and established the
first Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere., After the United
States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, 2 President John F.
Kennedy imposed an economic trade blockade against Cuba through
Presidential Proclamation No. 3447 of February 4, 19623 and Cuban
Assets Control Regulations of July 8, 1963.4 The Proclamation prohi-

*Editor's Note: Recently, the Soviet Union announced plans to remove all troops and to
stop all economic assistance to Cuba. Therefore, these current events should be taken into
consideration when reading this article.
1. Shneyer & Barta, The Legality of the U.S. Economic Blockade of Cuba Under International Law, 13 CASE WEST. RES. J. OF INT'L L. 451 (1981).
2. Id.
3. 3 C.F.R. § 157 (1959-1963 comp.).
4. 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1980).
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bited all forms of trade with Cuba. The Proclamation also authorized
the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce to make exceptions
only when consistent with the general policy of the United States. s
Statutory authority for these regulations derive from alternative
sources. 6 First, section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
provides that the President is authorized to establish and maintain a
total embargo on all trade between the United States and Cuba. 7
Second, section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 gives
the President the authority to regulate the flow of United States
currency in times of national emergencies declared by the President. 8
While Congress authorized the President to impose economic sanctions, it did not require the President to do so. 9 Therefore the economic
trade blockade against Cuba is an executive discretionary device which
can be discontinued if no longer considered in the national interest. 10
The United States economic trade blockade against Cuba has been
in effect for nearly thirty years. Throughout this time, Soviet economic
aid has enabled Cuba to maintain its anti-democratic posture. The
world has changed, however, and apparently so have the Soviets.
Responding, in part, to the effects of a stagnant economy, the
Soviet Union has increased personal liberties to its citizens, and softened its anti-democratic stance in order to attract western assistance
in the revamping of the Soviet economy. The United States has reciprocated by allowing United States companies to set up operations in
the Soviet Union. In addition, formerly socialist countries such as
Poland have begun to restructure their economic and political systems.
These global events have changed the very context in which Cuba
operates. Cuba is no longer aligned with its socialist counterparts.
Instead, Cuba remains the exception to the rule, a historical reminder
of communism's dark past.

5. Shneyer, supra note 1, at 453; see also Hammock, U.S. ProhibitionsOn Cuban Trade:
Are They Effective?, 1 FLA. INT'L L.J. 61 (1984) (Treasury Department regulates direct financial
transactions and importation of Cuban goods while the Commerce Department regulates American exports to Cuba).
6. Note, Legal Impediments to Normalization of Trade with Cuba, 8 LAW & POLICY IN
INT'L Bus. 1007, 1011 (1976).
7. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (Supp. III 1979).
8. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 5(b) was amended to apply
exclusively in times of war; however, subsequenct legislation grandfathered existing exercises
of the President's "national emergence" authorities. See Regan v. Wald, 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT.

792, 795 (July 1984).
9. Shneyer, supra note 1, at 453.
10. Regan v. Wald, supra note 8, at 796.
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This article considers the question of whether it is in the United
States' national interest to re-establish trade with Cuba. Specifically
this note addresses whether the economic blockade should be lifted in
light of the economic and political considerations of the day.
II.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

A. Potential Benefits to the United States
In 1975, the United States House of Representatives conducted
hearings to determine whether the United States Trade Embargo of
Cuba should be lifted. 1 Several members of Congress as well as various
witnesses testified that the embargo should be lifted because the original purposes of the embargo had failed. 12 The purpose of the embargo
as stated in the 1962 Cuban Resolution, 18 were: (1) to prevent the
communist regime in Cuba from extending its influence in Latin
America by force; (2) to assist the Cuban people in reaching self-determination; and (3) to deter the creation of an externally supported
4
military capability that would endanger the United States.'
Despite assertions that the general purposes of the embargo had
failed, particular attention was directed towards the deprivation of
economic benefits to the United States.15 The embargo has allowed
the replacement of American installations in Cuba by companies from
Western Europe, Japan and Canada. 16 Since the Cuban infrastructure
had previously depended upon United States products, the effect of
the embargo in the view of several analysts was to cause the United
States to lose its priority position in the Cuban economy in the event
17
of future trade normalization.
In addition to the loss of markets, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations prohibited United States companies within the United States
from trading with Cuba, yet simultaneously allowed United States

11. U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba: Hearings on H.R. 6382 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce and InternationalOrganizationsof the House Common International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter Embargo Hearings].
12. Id. at 64.
13. S.J. Res. 230, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 87 733, 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
14. Note, aupra note 6, at 1007. The intent was to gradually isolate Cuba economically so
that the Communist presence in the Western Hemisphere would be minimal.
15. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 69 (Report prepared by Professor Bertram M.
Gross, Distinguished Professor of Urban Affairs, Hunter College and Professor of Political
Science, City University of New York).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 69-75. (Mr. David E. Lefevre, Attorney at Law, stated that Canadian exports
to Cuba exceeded $150 million in 1974, a market that formerly belonged to the U.S.). Id. at 75.
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subsidiaries in foreign countries to engage in business with the same
country.18 The United States' policy was being undermined because
United States products inevitably reached the Cuban market.19 The
practical effect was to afford Cuba the benefit of United States products while denying domestic corporations the profits from those products. 20
Because Cuba depends upon imported goods for survival, 21 the
United States could benefit economically from resumed trade with
Cuba by supplying the island with those valued imports. 22 While Cuba's
geographic proximity makes it a natural trading partner of the United
States,m the potential Cuban market represents only a small fraction
of the United States economy.- From a purely economic standpoint,
5
the Cuban market is desirable to the United States, but not essential.?
B.

Potential Benefits to Cuba

Cuba has a great deal to gain from trade with the United States.2
The Cuban economy has been in poor condition for a long period of
time due to several factors.- However, most notably, the Cuban economy suffers from two critical afflictions: (1) the lack of "hard currency"
to purchase goods on world markets and pay debts, and (2) an extreme
dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid. 28

18. Note, supra note 6, at 1019.
19. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 69 (The Cuban government has an interior committtee dedicated to breaking the U.S. economic blockade through tactics such as the transshipment of goods, i.e. from the U.S. to Mexico to Cuba.).
20. Id. (profits include the failure to use U.S. labor to produce the products).
21. See Zimbalist, Cuba's External Economy: Reflection on Export Dependence, Soviet
Aid and ForeignDebt, 30 ComP. ECON. STUDIES 21 (1988) (Cuban trade resources are virtually
limited to sugar, nickel and tobacco).
22. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 75.
23. Id. at 56 (statement of the Honorable George McGovern, a U.S. Senator from the State
of South Dakota; Senator McGovern visited with Fidel Castro immediately prior to the Embargo
Hearings).
24. See generally Embargo Hearings, supra note 11.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 147 (statement of the Honorable Bill Chappell, Jr., a representative in Congress
from the State of Florida; Rep. Chappell stated that Cuba had a great advantage in normalizing
trade with the United States, while the United States had nothing to gain).
27. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 18 (statement of Mr. Jorge Mas Canosa, Member,
Executive Committee, Cuban Representation of Exiles (RECE); Sugar production is among the
factors contributing to Cuba's weak economy. Despite Castro's efforts to increase sugar production, it has decreased from pre Castro levels because the Cuban working classes have refused
to cooperate diligently under the oppressive system).
28. Zimbalist, supra note 21, at 31-42.
The majority of scholarly opinion which constitutes the mainstream Cubanology, concludes
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Were the United States to resume trade with Cuba, both of these
factors could change substantially. 29 Infusions of dollars would alleviate
the currency problems, while trade with the United States would
provide a price advantage to Cuba since the geographical proximity
of the United States would greatly reduce import costs. 3° The trade
advantage would lessen Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union be31
cause alternative sources of products would be available to Cuba.
Additionally, since the Soviet Union provides such enormous
economic support to Cuba in terms of loans and credits, Soviet
economic pressures force the Cuban government to compromise foreign
policy determinations.2 The Cuban government would welcome an
opportunity to rid themselves of this economic leverage. 33 Resumption3
of trade with the United States would present such an opportunity. 4
Re-establishing trade with the United States, however, presents
economic hurdles that would have to be surpassed before any meaningful trade could occur. 35
C. Settling the Cuban Claims
Several obstacles potentially impede any prospect of future trade
with Cuba.m First, virtually all United States-owned property in Cuba
was nationalized by 1961 after attempts at expropriation agreements
failed.37 In response, the United States Government froze all Cuban
nationals' assets on July 8, 1963. 3 Reconciliation of these debts is an
issue that must be resolved prior to trade normalization.

that Cuban economic policies have virtually failed in the last 30 years. Even Zimbalist, who is
generally considered to be a critic of the mainstream Cubanology because of its analytical basis
concedes that, "Soviet economic aid is enormous and the Cuban economy would scarely be what
it is without it." Id. at 31.
For a general discussion of the differing assessments of Cuba's economy, see Hanratty,
DifferingPerspectives on Castro'sCuba (Book Review), 38 PROBS. OF COMMUNISM 108 (1989).
29. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 88-112 (statement of Mr. Jorge I. Dominguez,
Research Fellow of the Center for Internation Affairs, Harvard University).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (Cuban government was forced to endorse the Soviet invasion of Czechoslavakia,
because the Soviets froze the level of oil shipments to Cuba).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Note, supra note 6, at 1027.
36. Id.
37. Id. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 376 (S.D.N.Y.

1961).
38.

See 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1975).
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If amounts of frozen and nationalized assets were similar, a "setting-off' of both countries' debts could take place. However, the essential problem with the frozen assets and expropriation claims is the
disparity of amounts.3 The Cuban government seized assets valued
at almost $2 billion, while the net value of the frozen assets in the
United States is approximately $30 million.40 Before trade can take
place between the two nations, a settlement agreement would have
to be reached where United States citizens would be adequately compensated.41

Any agreement reached by the two nations would have to provide
for the possibility of expropriation claim holders attempting to attach
Cuban assets entering the United States' jurisdiction.4 One way to
avoid Cuban assets from being attached would be to provide that the
transfer of title to traded goods would occur outside the United
States.4 Nonetheless, the settlement agreement would need to include
provisions allowing United States nationals access to a forum vested
with the power necessary to resolve expropriation claim disputes.
The United States economy could benefit from trade with Cuba.
However, even if the settlement of Cuban claims could be adequately
attained, moral and political obstacles block the path of free trade.
Whether the United States should resume trade with Cuba depends
upon a balancing between economic interests and moral and political
considerations.
III.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.

Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,- approved by the
United Nations, recognizes the equal and inalienable rights of all mem-

39. Note, supra note 6, at 1028 (some of the outstanding claims have been reduced through
the use of income tax writeoffs).
40. Id. The exact amount of U.S. assets nationalized was $1,851,057,358. Id. The face
amount of the frozen Cuban assets is $148.8 million, but the actual net worth is much less
because part of the assets constitute loans secured by Cuban assets. Id.
41. Id. See also Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. at 382-6. A prior settlement offer made by the
Cuban government was considered illusory by U.S. nationals.
42. Note, s-upra note 6, at 1029.
43. Id. Another related problem is the use of Cuban ships or planes for the transport of
traded goods. Id. Cuban vessels entering U.S. territory could also be seized to repay outstanding
claims. Id.
44. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/777, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declarationof
Hunman Rights].
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bers of the human family.5 Cuba is a member of the United Nations
and has therefore pledged to honor the principles of this proclamation.46
Since its inception, the Castro government, however, has violated the
7
human rights of Cubans.4
The practice of institutionalized terror and community hate has
affected thousands and has resulted in gross human rights violations.4
Cuban political prisoners have endured some of the most cruel, inhumane, and degrading prison conditions documented. 49 Cuban political
prisoners have been subjected to murder, physical and mental torture,
insufficient and revolting food, denial of mail from relatives, forced
labor, repeated beatings, serving their sentences naked, and imposition
of political indoctrination. w Some prisoners known as "plantados"have
refused political indoctrination and have suffered for their beliefs.51
These plantados have refused to work for the Castro government
and have refused to embrace the repressive political ideology. 2 They
have suffered through hunger strikes, mutilation by prison guards,
torture, and even death through lack of medical attention. One prisoner, Clodomiro Miranda, a former member of the Castro army remained in prison with untreated gunshot wounds in his legs.- Within
a short time, Mr. Miranda developed maggots in his wounds and had
to be executed while lying on the ground because he could not sustain
the weight of his body.5

45.

Id.

46.

Lillich, Legal Policy Considerations,in

MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 127 (1986).

47. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 25 (Castro's rise to power was immediately
signified by televised executions of ex-Batista supporters).
48. A. VALLADARES, CONTRA TODA ESPERANZA (1985) (careless anti-Castro comments
to a neighbor could result in midnight arrest and detention; in many instances citizens were
dragged off to prison and were never even told what the charges were).
49. Id. (families of political prisoners have also been degraded and humiliated by being
subjected to strip searches in order to visit their loved ones).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 27 (these plantados had been stripped of everything else but would not give up
their dignity and conviction).
52. 87 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 2122, at 74 (1987) (statement by Ambassador Vernon A.
Walters, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the 43rd Session of the
United Nations Commission of Human Rights in Geneva on March 5, 1987).
53. Id. Cuba also has the highest per capita number of political prisoners in the world.
54. A. VALLADARES, supra note 48, at 24. (Mr. Miranda originally served Castro with

the purpose of overthrowing Fulgencio Batista; Mr. Miranda then turned against Castro when
he realized the repressive system Castro sought to implement).
55. Id. (Armando Valladares, the author, witnessed these events).
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The human rights violations are not limited to political prisoners. 6
Cuba is a state in which basic human freedoms and rights are denied
to the majority of the citizenry. 57 Indeed, no other Latin American
nation has seen over fifteen percent of its population flee to surrounding nations in search of basic freedoms.For nearly thirty years, Castro refused to allow human rights
groups to inspect prison conditions on the island.59 After a great deal
of political pressure, Castro invited the United Nations Human Rights
Commission (UN) to observe the human rights situation in Cuba.6 In
April 1989, the United States Department of State published an update
61
on the condition of human rights in Cuba.
The State Department reported that following the initial UN inspection, there had been minor improvements in human rights conditions.6 However, the Cuban government nullified these improvements
by ordering the harassment and imprisonment of human rights activists who had demonstrated during the visit of the UN commission.6
The Cuban government currently fails to recognize the right to privacy.-I Telephones are tapped, mail is censored, and over 80,000 block
committees exist to monitor the activities of others and ensure that
their actions conform with the ideals of the revolution.6
The Castro regime's version of freedom of speech does not extend
to protect the rights of citizens to criticize the nation's leadership,
and freedom of the press is virtually eliminated since there is only
one major newspaper, Granma. Granma is admittedly a propaganda

87 DEPOT ST. BULL. 2122, at 71-72 (1987).
57. Id. at 71. Generally, Cuban citizens cannot travel off the island of Cuba. Id. The Cuban
government only grants travel permits to citizens that leave their families behind, to ensure
the return of the citizen. Id.
56.

58.

Id. at 72.

59. Id.
60. 25 U.N. Chron. 65 (June 1988). The Cuban government did not want to be upstaged
by the U.S. demands for human rights inspections in Cuba, so the Cubans took the initiative
and extended an invitation. Id.
61. 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2145, at 59 (1989).
62. Id. (approximately 250 political prisoners had been released and allowed to emigrate).
63. See id. at 60. Reports from prisoners also indicated that the Human Rights Commission
had inspected cells and prisons that were cleaned up in anticipation of the inspection. Id.
Following the inspection, however, conditions returned to their prior status. Id.
64. See id. at 64.
65. Id. See also Olivieri, Los Delitos Contra La Seguridad Del Estado Eu El Derecho
Penal Cubano, 55 REV. JUR. DE LA UNIV. DE PUERTO Rico, 609, 620 (1986) (discussing the
various legal mechanisms used by the Cubans to detect and thwart "counterrevolutionary"
activity) [hereinafter Delitos Contra La Seguridad].
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publication for the Cuban Communist Party. 6 Therefore, the Cuban
population is denied the opportunity to receive objective reporting of
international and domestic events.6 7 In an attempt to provide Cubans
with different perspectives on international news, the United States
has established Radio Marti, a radio program which transmits news
and information directly to the island of Cuba. While Radio Marti
supplements the Cuban press, the Cuban judicial system remains
grossly inadequate and "due process" is an unknown concept.Since the beginning of the present communist regime, the Cuban
government has systematically abrogated the rights of its citizens to
receive a fair trial. In 1959, the Castro regime amended the Cuban
Constitution of 1940 to include a provision establishing the death penalty.69 The Cuban government also passed legislation providing for the
retroactive application of penal laws and the creation of new crimes
known as counterrevolutionarycrimes.70 Counterrevolutionary crimes
were defined so broadly, that they included virtually any act which
would serve to impede the progress of the revolution . 7' The purpose
behind these changes was to punish persons "responsible for the
tyranny" allegedly present in the pre-Castro era, and to purge those
persons opposing the revolution. 72
In order to effectuate the new legislation, the Castro regime superseded the existing judicial system with Revolutionary Tribunals.7These tribunals, comprised mainly of members of the military, were

66. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 120 (interview of Fidel Castro in 1974 where he
stated that the newspaper was an instrument of the revolution and that the opposing viewpoints
possessed no instrinsic value to the revolution).
67. But see Ibarra, Different from Eastern Europe, 37 World Press Review No. 5, at 35
(May 1990) (where several Cuban journalists claim that never in the history of the revolution
has there been any formal censorship of writers).
68. See 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2145, at 61 (1989).
69. Delitos Contra La Seguridad, supra note 65, at 613.
70. Id. at 613-614.
71. Id. at 616. Counterrevolutionary crimes included the following: crimes against the integrity and stability of the nation; crimes against the powers of the state; publicly inciting treason;
rebellion; . . . distributing counterrevolutionary propaganda; and, acts against the national
economy which jeopardize human life. Id. Cuban socialist thought views as permissible those
political crimes committed for the purposes of improving society, and considers unacceptable
those crimes that cause society to recede. Ironically, the standard used to determine whether
crimes benefit or hurt society is whether they further socialist goals. In other words, acts
committed in favor of socialism are acceptable, while acts committed against socialism are called
"counterrevolutionary crimes," and punishable by death. Id. at 612, 614.
72. Id. at 613.
73. Id.
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given authority to preside over most criminal matters including the
new counterrevolutionary crimes. 74The tribunals were also authorized
to speed up criminal proceedings and order executions based upon
75
these summary proceedings.
In 1973, the revolutionary tribunals were replaced with Popular
Tribunals comprised primarily of persons elected by workers.76 In
1979, a new penal code was enacted that restructured the Cuban
judicial system.7 7 While the establishment of the new penal code appeared to be a positive step towards the preservation of human rights,
several elements of the old system permeated in the new.
The all-encompassing counterrevolutionary crimes which could easily be used to suppress political opposition, were now labelled crimes
against the security of the state.7- To illustrate, one specific act
categorized as a crime against the security of the state is "enemy
propaganda." Article 108 of the Cuban penal code provides a penalty
of up to fifteen years imprisonment for anyone convicted of engaging
in "enemy propaganda."0 Enemy propaganda is defined as any, "oral
' Pursuant to
or written propaganda contrary to the socialist order."81
this legislative scheme, anyone speaking out against the socialist system of government runs the risk of being imprisoned for fifteen years.
Therefore, Article 108 not only creates a "chilling effect" on speech,
but through its penal provisions violates the right to freedom of opinion
and expression as recognized by the United Nations in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 2
Article 108 is one example of how the new Cuban penal code affects
the substantive criminal law. Procedurally, Cuban criminal defendants
are afforded no greater protections than before. In several cases,
depending upon the crime, defendants are categorically denied the
opportunity to be released on bail, and are tried by tribunals operating

74. Id. at 613-14 (citing the Cuban Social Defense Code, and the Gaceta Oficial de la
Republica de Cuba).
75. Id. at 615.
76. Id. at 619-20.
77. Id. at 620-25.
78. Id. at 622-25.
79. Id. at 623 (citing to the Cuban Penal Code, art. 108, title I).
80. Id. at 623.
81. Id. at 619 (enemy propaganda as defined in the Cuban Social Defense Code).
82. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 44, at 75. Article 19 provides:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers." Id.
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behind "closed doors. '" These policies also violate rights recognized
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and signify the overall
status of human rights conditions in Cuba. 4
To resume trade with Cuba, many improvements in the area of
human rights would have to occur. If the United States were to resume
trade with Cuba under the present system, the effect would be to
recognize a repressive government contrary to American ideals. 5 President Bush indicated the United States policy toward human rights
in Cuba by stating, "there have been slight and superficial improvements. But much more needs to be done before the Cuban people can
truly be said to enjoy the rights guaranteed them by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."s
Cuba has attempted to spread its repressive policies elsewhere in
the world through subversive tactics that encourage other countries
to replace their governments with systems similar to the Cuban Communist model.7 Fidel Castro himself has stated that the essence of
the Cuban revolution is political change obtained through military
force.8 The Cuban government targets countries with serious internal
problems and then internationalizes what would otherwise be local
conflicts within these countries by providing insurgents with military
capability. 9 The process of internationalizing internal domestic problems is referred to as the "export of revolution."
B.

Export of Revolution

The Cuban government has long promoted armed insurgencies in
all parts of the world.- Beginning in the 1960s with Che Guevara,
and continuing until the present, Cuba engages in efforts to destabilize

83. Delitos Contra La Seguridad, supra note 65, at 624.
84. See Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 44, at 73. The use of "closed
door" trials violates article 10 which provides in part, that everyone is, "entitled to full equality
to a fair and public hearing by an independant and impartial tribunal" (emphasis added). Id.
The retroactive application of penal laws violates article 11(2) which provides in part: "No one
shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute
a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed" (emphasis
added). Id.
85. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 44 (statement by the Hon. Dante B. Fascell,
U.S. Representative of Fla.)
86. See 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2146, at 83 (1989).
87. 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2059, at 68 (1982).
88. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 120.
89. 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2059, at 68 (1982).
90. Id.
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governments by promoting armed opposition movements. 9 Unlike the
rudimentary approach used in Che Guevara's attempts, where power
was obtained by arming the peasants, Cuban subversion is now backed
by an extensive secret intelligence network. 92
Cuba has trained guerrillas, supplied weapons, provided military
advisers, and even sent mercenary troops to fight battles in other
countriesY3 In addition, Cuba offers revolutionary training programs
for select foreign students to encourage the implantation of the Cuban
ideology in the students' home countries. 94 The entire spectrum of
activities is supported by a complex Communist propaganda network
which disseminates the "revolutionary" view of world events. 95
Perhaps the most important fact that makes Cuba a prime base
for subversive activities is its strategic location in the western hemisphere. Being located at the center of the hemisphere, Cuba can ideologically and militarily infiltrate surrounding Latin American countries
and isolate the United States.9 Since many of the Central American
countries suffer from internal economic and social problems, and are
geographically proximate to Cuba, the Cuban government is most
active in promoting insurgencies in Central America. 97 The immediate
goals of Cuba appear to be the control of the revolution in Nicaragua,
9
and the destabilization of the government of El Salvador. 8
The Cuban government trained the leadership of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) which eventually overthrew the
Somoza regime in Nicaragua.- In preparation for the first FSLN
offensive in the fall of 1978, arms were first flown from Cuba to
Panama, then shipped to Costa Rica, where they were supplied to

91. Id. at 69.
92. Id. at 68. Insurgents are trained in urban and rural guerrilla warfare, explosives, and
even underwater demolition. Id. To disguise the true occupations of the intelligence agents,
they are also instructed in civilian skills such as automotive mechanics, carpentry and heavy
equipment operation which will aid their infiltration in other countries. Id.
93. Id. at 68-9 (Cuba has used troops extensively in Latin America and Africa).
94. Id. at 71 (education of these students is geared towards accepting the Cuban Communist
model).

95. Id. at 68.
96. See Embargo Hearings, supra note 11 (increased communism in the region could compromise valuable sea lanes and trade routes).
97. See 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2059, at 80 (1982) (statement by Ambassador Thomas 0.
Enders, Assistant Secretary for Inter American Affairs, before the subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 14, 1981).
98. Id. at 68. As of this writing Salvadoran rebels had mounted a large scale offensive
against the Salvadoran government. Id.

99.

Id. at 72.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss2/7

12

Mesa: Should the UnitedTRADE
StatesWITH
Re-establish
CUBA? Trade with Cuba? An Assessm

the Nicaraguan guerrillas based in northern Costa Rica.' °° In 1979,
Cuba helped organize an international brigade to fight alongside FSLN
guerrillas. 10 1 By 1982, Cuba had increased the number of Cuban perSonnel in Nicaragua to over 5,000.102 Cuba also utilized Nicaraguan
territory to train guerrillas from neighboring countries such as El

Salvador. 10 3
Cuba's aid to Salvadoran rebels was on a small scale during the
Nicaraguan civil war. - After the fall of Somoza however, the Cuban
government intensified its efforts to help the pro-Cuban rebels come
to power in El Salvador. 01 5 First, the Cuban government attempted
to unify El Salvador's leftist groups by sponsoring a December 1979
meeting in Havana to establish a guerrilla coalition. 10 By mid 1980,
10 7
the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) had been coordinated.
Then, the Cuban government arranged for the acquisition and delivery
of arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe to El Salvador. -°
Finally, the Cubans influenced the DRU to launch a general offensive
against the government of El Salvador in January of 1981.19
Cuba's approach in aiding Salvadoran rebels exemplified the formula that Cuba would use elsewhere in promoting insurgencies. 110 The
process begins by unifying radical groups within the target country."'
Next, the groups are trained in guerrilla warfare using arms obtained
by the Cuban government." 2 Then Cuban military advisors encourage
guerrillas to engage in terrorism to undermine existing governments."13
100.

Id.

101. Id. The international brigade contained mercenaries from all over Latin America. Id.
102. Id. (Cuban personnel included members of the military, teachers, medical staff, and
specialized military advisers).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 72, 73.
105. Id. at 73.
106. Id. The meeting in Havana resulted in an initial agreement between the Armed Forces
of National Resistance (FARN), the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), and the Popular
Liberation Forces (FPL). Id. In May of 1980, the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) also
joined the pact. Id.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id. The general offensive failed and in February of 1982, the DRU leadership convened
in Havana to improve their strategy. Id.
110. See id. at 71,
111. See id. Individually these groups would not have the power to overthrow a government.
Id.
112. See id. (Cuba either sends the arms or arranges for their sale and shipment from
other countries).
113. See id. (training of these guerrillas is not limited to Latin Americans as Abu Khalaf,
a leader of the military branch of Al Fatah in Beirut, confirmed that Palestinian agents have
received training in Cuba since the 1960s).
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The United States Department of State has issued reports of similar Cuban involvement in Guatemala, 114 Costa Rica," 5 Honduras,1 6 and
the Caribbean." 7 In addition, Cuban interference has been linked to
countries in South America as well.,,8 Several analysts have noted
that under these conditions, United States trade with Cuba would
serve to subsidize the Cuban export of revolution." 9
The Cuban export of revolution is not limited to Latin America.
Cuba has sent mercenaries to fight in Angola on behalf of the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). 20 Cuba eventually
2
escalated its presence in Angola to over 50,000 confirmed troops. '
After tremendous political struggle,- = the United States announced
in January of 1989, that an agreement had been reached to withdraw
Cuban troops.123
While the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is a positive
step toward a United States-Cuban trade relationship, the United
States probably would not resume trade with Cuba until the export
of revolution stops.' 24 Revolution is not the only export Cuba has
distributed. The Cuban government has been implicated in international narcotics trafficking, which erects yet another barrier to trade
with the United States.

114. Id. at 74.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 75.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 76-8. Evidence shows that Cuba has been active in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay
and most notably Colombia where the Cuban government has supported the M-19 terrorists, a
deadly group of extremists. Id. President Turbay of Colombia suspended relations with Cuba
on March 23, 1981 after discovering that Cuba had trained the M-19 guerrillas to overthrow
the Colombian government. Id. In a New York Times interview (Aug. 13, 1981) President
Turbay compared the betrayal to another Pearl Harbor. Id.
119. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 17 (statement by Mr. Jorge Mas Canosa stating
that U.S. trade with Cuba would strengthen Cuba's efforts to destabilize governments throughout
the world).
120. 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2134, at 17 (1989). The MPLA was one of three nationalist
movements competing for control of Angola. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) was supported by Zaire while the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) was receiving assistance from China. Id. at 16, 17.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id. at 17-20.
123. 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2142, at 16 (1989).
124. See Note, supra note 6, at 1043.
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C.

The Cuban Drug Connection

Documented evidence demonstrating Cuba's role in drug trafficking
to the United States dates back to 1961.1 According to a Drug Enforcement Agency report, Che Guevara and Salvador Allende 126 participated in a Havana meeting to discuss the creation of a drug network
that would extend from Latin America through Cuba to the United
States.12 Evidence provided by Jose Blandon Castillo, a former aide
to indicted Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega, linked Fidel
Castro to narcotics trafficking. 12 Castillo met with Castro to arrange
for Castro's intervention in a dispute between Noriega and the Medellin drug cartel. 129
In addition, a federal grand jury in Miami returned a sealed indictment against seventeen people that used Cuba as a station to smuggle
narcotics from South America to the United States.130 The indictment
indicated that Cuban military officials were involved, and that even
a Cuban piloted MiG fighter had escorted a drug plane to safety.13
Major Florentino A. Lombard, a former Cuban intelligence officer
who defected in 1987, claimed that Castro provided suspected narcotics
trafficker Robert Vesco with a safe haven at Cayo Largo, a small
resort island south of Cuba. I
The Cuban government's involvement with Robert Vesco included
narcotics trafficking and the smuggling of United States goods to
Cuba.1- Planes carrying drugs destined for the United States would
return loaded with United States products. 134 The United States prod-

125. Ehrenfield, Castro Is Shocked! Shocked! to Find Drug Dealing Comrades, Wall St.
J., June 23, 1989, at A15, col. 3.
126. Id. (Salvador Allende was at the time a Senator from Chile).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (Castro urged Noriega to settle the~dispute as he pointed out that the members
of the Medellin Cartel are "serious people").
130. Id.
131. Id., see also N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at A21, col. 1 (Article by Elliot Abrams which
observed that while drifting American yachts are immediately picked up by Cuban authorities,
drug-laden planes and boats travel undisturbed through Cuban air space and waters.).
132. Ehrenfield, supranote 125. Vesco is only part of the narcotics-trafficking organization.
Id. Evidence obtained from a Trading With the Enemy Act (TEA) case also linked Vesco with
various Canadian organized crime figures. Id. After the U.S. began cracking down on the
organization several members fled to Yugoslavia; other members called as witnesses in the TEA
case mysteriously died and one individual, Paul Volpe, was found murdered in the trunk of his
wife's car. Id.
133. Frank. Partners in Crime, FORBES, Sept. 24, 1984, at 42.
134. Id. at 43.
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ucts were obtained by Mexican front companies and in one instance
involved the smuggling of a United States manufactured machine that
would transform waste sugar cane into flammable briquettes which
could then be burned for energy.'The Cuban government's connection with the drug trade is logical
since it serves a dual purpose: (1) to obtain United States dollars to
diminish Cuba's shortage of hard currency, 13 and (2) to sidestep the
United States trade embargo with Cuba. 137 The United States government staunchly has attempted to stop the flow of narcotics into the
United States by increasing its anti-drug forces. 138 The hard line United
States anti-drug policy cannot be reconciled with lifting the trade
embargo with Cuba because the Cuban government has repeatedly
undermined the United States policy objectives. To lift the embargo
would be tantamount to rewarding the Cubans for their illegal activities. Another less volatile political issue remains to be discussed:
the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. 8 9
D.

The United States Naval Base at Guantanamo

The United States maintains a naval station at Guantanamo, Cuba
as a result of post Spanish-American War treaties with Cuba. 140 Cuba
agreed to lease lands "necessary for coaling or naval stations '' 141 in a
1903 treaty that was subsequently incorporated in the Treaty of Relations in 1934.142 The Treaty of Relations is presently considered
operative by the United States Department of State.14
The lease agreement between the United States and Cuba does
not have an expiration date.144 The lease provides that Cuba must
assent to the United States exercise of "complete jurisdiction and
control" over the area, 14 5 "so long as the United States of America
shall not agree to a modification of its present limits."' 1

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
23, 1903,
141.
142.

Id.
Zimbalist, supra note 21, at 31-42.
Frank, supra, note 133, at 43.
Ehrenfield, supra note 125.
Note, supra note 6, at 1039.
Treaty with Cuba Defining the Future Relations of the United States with Cuba, May
art. VII, 33 Stat. 2248 (1905), T.S. No. 437.
Id. at 2252.
Treaty of Relations, May 29, 1934, art. VII, 33 Stat. 2248 (1934), T.S. No. 437.

143.

U.S.

144.
145.

Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 101.
Lease of Coaling on Naval Stations to the United States, art. III (1903) Foreign Rel.

DEP'T OF STATE,

Publ. No. 8755,

TREATIES IN FORCE

62 (1974).

U.S. 350.
146.

Treaty of Relations, supra note 142.
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The United States military presence in Cuba is an annoyance to
the Cuban government.14 7 Therefore, withdrawal of American forces
in Cuba is a long-term goal of Cuban foreign policy.14 Fidel Castro,
however, has stated that the Guantanamo issue is not a major impediment to Cuban trade with the United States. 49
While resolution of the Guantanamo issue is not crucial to trade
between the countries, the naval base remains a substantial bargaining
chip that could be used advantageously by the United States.-w The
lure of a Cuba without an American presence may be sufficient to
obtain favorable terms in the event of trade normalization. Guantanamo then, could be an integral part of any future negotiations
between the United States and Cuba.
IV.

EVENTS POSSIBLY LEADING TO THE REOPENING OF TRADE

When evaluating the economic and political considerations involved
in lifting the United States trade embargo with Cuba, it becomes
apparent that any economic benefit afforded the United States will
be greatly outweighed by the political ramifications. Therefore, the
only feasible way to re-establish trade with Cuba would be through
fundamental changes in the Cuban ideology. Castro would have to
change the nature of his government and allow Cuba to have a government responsive to the will of the people.',,
President Bush repeatedly has praised those Latin American nations that have held open, legitimate elections in selecting their leaders
in government. 1 - The President has even indicated a willingness to
have a United States relationship with ideologically socialist countries
as long as the form of government was chosen by the people.1- The

147. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 101.
148. Id. (The U.S. influence on Cuba has always been a source of deep resentment to Fidel
Castro. According to the "Fidelista" approach to Cuban history, it is claimed that Cuba has
always been treated as a colony of the U.S. and that only under the Castro regime has Cuba
been truly independent. The irony of course, is that now Cuba is more of a Soviet colony than
it ever was a U.S. colony.). See also D'Zurilla, Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and the
Fidelista Interpretationof Cuban ConstitutionalHistory, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1223-83 (1981).
149. Id. at 116.
150. Id. at 101.
151. Embargo Hearings,supra note 11, at 142 (statement by the Honorable Claude Pepper,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida; opposing the lifting of the U.S. trade
embargo).
152. 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2148, at 68-71 (1989).
153. See 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2150, at 92 (1989). The President has shown this by the
policy towards Nicaragua and the call for free, legitimate elections. Id.
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focus of the Bush administration in this context has been to promote
and strive for democratic elections in the Latin American countries,
rather than to promote specific ideological regimes. The Bush policy
should dispel Cuban fears that the United States seeks to colonize or
control the affairs of Cuba.'15
Legitimate elections in Cuba would be the key to lifting the trade
embargo because free elections would induce other changes in Cuba's
political situation. Were Cuba to permit legitimate elections, human
rights would improve, because of the internal political freedom necessary for a true democratic government. Legitimate elections and
human rights reforms would satisfy the internal political issues that
would have to be resolved in order to re-establish trade between the
1
United States and Cuba. 5

Regarding Cuba's foreign policy, the world wide export of revolution would have to cease.'15 The United States could not stand idle
and allow the future of Latin America to be dictated by the Cuban
government. 157 Certainly, the United States would not economically
support such subversive activities through the lifting of the trade
embargo. 1,
With a joint resolution of both Cuban internal and external issues,
the United States could then lift the trade embargo, and negotiate a
settlement of expropriation claims. The lifting of the trade embargo
would in turn alleviate Cuba's desperate need for a hard currency.
Cuba could then stop its activities in narcotics trafficking, because the
needed hard currency could be obtained through legitimate channels
of foreign trade. The Guantanamo naval base could be one of the
factors subject to negotiation, and possibly be included in a settlement
agreement between the two nations.
Unfortunately, there is no indication that the previously described
scenario could occur. First, in thirty years Castro has not allowed the
Cuban citizens to democratically elect their leadership. The only "elections" in Cuba have been for minor municipal positions, and have

154. Id. See also Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 121.
155. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 142-143 (legitimate elections are only the beginning, but given the current line of U.S. foreign policy elections would be the quickest way to
begin to restore U.S.-Cuban relationships).
156. See Embargo Hearings, supra note 11.
157. 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2059, at 81 (1982).
158. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 142-144.
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occurred in a system where one political party exists and opposition
to the party is closely monitored. 159
Second, Castro has indicated that the Cuban government will not
pursue socialist reforms as the Soviets have done with their policy of
perestroika and glasnost. 16° Castro has equated proponents of socialist
reform with dissidents and counter-revolutionaries.6' Castro has even
banned Soviet publications discussing Socialist reforms as subversive
material. 12
The Cuban drug activities are also profitable for Cuba in two ways.
First, they provide a method of obtaining hard currency. Second,
Cuba can enrich itself and simultaneously harm the United States. By
providing the United States with illegal narcotics, Cuba can help increase the population of drug users and undermine the anti-drug policy
of the United States.
The grim view of future trade prospects between the United States
and Cuba simply exemplifies the Cuban political reality. Cuba's vehement support of repressive policies stands in the way of future trade
between the United States and Cuba. The United States should remain
firm in its policies of economic blockade especially in light of recent
international events.
V.

WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD FIRMLY ADHERE TO ITS
POLICIES

A.

Cuba's Internal PoliticalProblems

In June of 1989, eight Cuban officials were arrested and charged
with drug-trafficking. 16 Among the eight Cubans charged were General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez,- and Brigadier General Patricio de la
Guardia,15 both highly respected members of the Cuban military government. 16 The Cuban government then proceeded to hold highly pub-

159. Id. at 121 (Castro has referred to these elections as an "experiment" stating that while
there has been a 90% voter turn out rate it is not certain whether voting provides the best
method of furthering Cuban communist goals. Castro even stated that if the experiment worked,
all general elections would then also be held; Castro has never allowed this to happen.).
160. Abrams, What Are Soviet Intentions in Latin America?, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1989,
at A7, col. 5.
161. Id.
162. Id. (As one analyst interestingly noted, under Castro's view of those who advocate
socialist reforms, Gorbachev would have to be purged as a dissident and counter revoluntionary.).
163. Ehrenfield, supra note 125.
164. Id. (a Cuban war hero in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Angola).
165. Id. (commander of an elite Special Forces brigade answering directly to Fidel Castro).
166. Id.
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licized "show trials. '' 167 Cuba convicted the officials for betraying their
country and the Cuban Communist revolution.l-a The officials were
executed and Cuba rid itself of "moral traitors. '",
Several analysts, however, have stated that the true purpose behind these drug trials was to purge potential opponents of Castro from
the political arena. 170 General Ochoa was a very popular and respected
war hero that was openly cheered in public.171 The popularity enjoyed
by General Ochoa was apparently very disconcerting to Fidel Castro
who publicly accused Ochoa of behaving with "unbraked populism."1 72
Castro may have also feared a situation arising in Cuba similar to
the 1974 insurrection in Portugal.' 73 Disgusted Portuguese soldiers
returning from an unpopular war in Africa overthrew the dictatorship
to improve political and economic repression.174 Evidence suggests that
General Ochoa was acting as a sounding board to returning Angola
veterans unhappy with the state of affairs in Cuba.175 General Ochoa
may have been the likely candidate to lead an insurgency against the
Castro regime.176
In addition, a successor to Fidel Castro would have to be protected
from others attempting to obtain control of the government. 177 Fidel
Castro's designated successor is his brother Raul.-17 Whether Raul

167. Abrams, Castro Looks to the Future - Nervously, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at 21
(stating it is unlikely that anyone in the Stalinist regime of Cuba could have engaged in narcotics
trafficking without the knowledge of Castro himself).
168. Id. (officials admitted at their trials that they had betrayed Cuba; Gen. Ochoa stated
he had no reason to live).
169. Id. See also Ehrenfield, supra note 125 (official Cuban newspaper, "Granma," stated
that moral treason would sooner or later lead to political treason).
170. Id. (statement by Pamela Falk, a Cuban scholar at Columbia University in New York).
See also Abrams, supra note 167.
171. Id. Abrams, supra note 167 (statement by Enrique Baloyra, a University of Miami
Cubanologist).
172. Id. (Analysts have also pointed out that since General Ochoa spent so much time
abroad, it is very unlikely that he could have organized and participated in any drug smuggling
organizations based in Cuba.).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Abrams, supra note 167 (more likely that Castro was clearing the ground for his
brother Raul's planned succession).
177. Id.
178. Id. (Reports have also indicated that there was friction between General Ochoa and
Raul Castro, with the latter feeling threatened by the former's greater popularity and
charisma.). See also Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in the First Two Decades of the Revolution: Policies and Performance, B:5 Estudios Ibero-Americanos 19 (1982). Mesa-Lago esti-
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could carry on the regime in a bankrupt, isolated country is uncertain.' 79 The chance of success is increased, however, if Cuba's internal
political opposition (possibly to have been headed by Ochoa) is eliminated. 180
In light of the evidence linking Fidel Castro to narcotics trafficking,
the show trials to Cuban officials appear to be an exercise in hypocrisy.18 l Nevertheless, the show trials serve two important political
functions for Cuba. 18 First, they provide a method of eliminating
potential rivals for governmental power. 1s Second, Fidel Castro can
distance himself from long standing accusations of Cuban complicity
in the drug trade and hope to thaw United States-Cuban relations by
appearing to crack down on drugs.'4
Regardless of the precise theory, the facts support a conclusion
that Cuba suffers from intense internal problems. Economic and social
problems have historically plagued Cuba, but now an additional factor
has entered the picture - Cuba's changing relationship with the Soviet
Union.
B.

Cuba's Political Isolation

The Soviet-Cuban relationship has been suffering because of a divergence in political ideology.a8 The Soviet Union has sought and
obtained various Socialist reforms through its policy of perestroika
and glasnost. as Cuba has instead vehemently opposed any changes in
the Cuban government indicating that they are unnecessary on the

mated that the current Soviet-Cuban trade war was approximately equal to pre-Castro U.S.-Cuban
trade and noted that, despite the Soviet's replacement of the U.S. or Cuba's trading partner,
Cuba has been unable to use the Soviet aid to establish a self-sustaining economy. Id. at 28.
179. Abrams, supra note 167. (While Fidel Castro has been a forceful, imposing public
figure it is unclear whether Raul Castro possesses those leadership qualities. Raul Castro is
better known as Cuba's "man in Russia," preferring adherence to the Soviets whenever possible
instead of independent action.). But see Graham, Twilight of the Revolution, 37 World Press
Review No.5, at 33 (May 1990) (where a Soviet official stated that Soviet aid to Cuba amounted
to between $2 billion and $3 billion, "lower than the Americans think"). Id. at 34.
180. Abrams, supra note 167.
181. Ehrenfield, supra note 125 ("revelation" that Cuban military officials were involved
in narcotics trafficking contradicts thirty years of persistent denial by Fidel Castro that any
Cubans were involved in this form of immorality).
182. Id.
183. Abrams, upra note 167.
184. Abrams, supra note 160.

185.

Id.

186. Id. The Soviets have realized that economically they could not survive under the
former political infrastructure. Id.
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island of Cuba. 187 Castro has also criticized Cuban supporters of Gor-

bachev stating that, "we are not going to tolerate this deviationism
within the ranks of our party."l s8
The Soviet Union and Cuba recently signed a treaty that redefined
the relationship between the two powers.le 9 Gorbachev stated in a
speech in Havana, that he was categorically opposed to the export of
revolution. 190 However, the Soviet Union continues to economically
support Cuba, the most prolific exporter of revolution. Analysts have
interpreted this dichotomy to mean that Gorbachev can only do so
much at one time.191 Given Gorbachev's priorities and political constraints in Moscow, a public fight with Castro would be adverse to
his long-term interests. 92 Ironically, however, with all of the political
issues involved, the ultimate critical danger to the Cuban government
is economics.
C. Cuba's Economic Isolation
The Cuban government isolated itself economically from the United
States when it declared a communist regime in Cuba.193 Part of the
Cuban insurgents' reasons for rebelling against Batista were to free
themselves from "Yankee Imperialism" and establish a truly independent state.194 Yet, in effect, the Cubans "broke away" from the United
States only to deliver themselves into the hands of the Soviets195
The Soviets contribute approximately between five and eight billion
dollars a year to the Cuban economy. '9The Soviets supply Cuba with

187. Id. Castro has attributed the Soviet need for reform to the vast cultural diversity
prevalent in the Soviet Union. Id.
188. Id. Castro's regime has been labeled a Stalinist movement, an accusation that Castro
laughs off by saying that in contrast his victims are all in perfect health. Id.
189. Keller, Gorbachev Signs Treaty with Cuba, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1989, at A8, col. 5.
190. Id.
191. Abrams, supra note 160.
192. Id. (The author indicated that since one of the reasons for socialist reform in the Soviet
Union was for economic growth, the Soviets may want to cease footing the bill for the stagnant
Cuban economy. Several analysts even believed that the Soviets would suspend Cuban aid in
the recent meeting between the two nations.).
193. Shneyer, supra note 1, at 453 (noting that the United States was one of Cuba's largest
trading partners and the U.S. influence abroad served to cut off significant trade with Cuba
from other countries; Castro considers the U.S. economic blockade an act of aggression against
the Cuban government).
194. Embargo Hearings, supra note 11, at 116.
195. Id. at 27 (statement by Jorge Mas Canosa).
196. Abrams, supra note 160.
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oil at substandard prices197 and purchase Cuban sugar at prices way

above the world market price. 198 In effect, the survival of the Cuban
Revolution has depended upon Soviet aid.1 9
Even with this enormous amount of Soviet aid, the standard of
living in Cuba has remained barely tolerable. 2°° If the Soviet Union
were to abandon Cuba, the Cuban government would be on the brink
of disaster since the Cuban economy cannot function in the future
without the vital Soviet aid.-° Economic dependence on the Soviet
Union places Cuba in a position of submission under Soviet economic
leverage.
The Soviets previously used their economic leverage in the CubanSoviet confrontation of 1968-1969.m The Soviets slowed oil and arms
shipments to Cuba and succeeded in obtaining Cuba's endorsement of
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 2°4 One analyst has stated that
the Soviets could use their economic leverage again in the face of
5
widening political differences with Cuba. If glasnost is legitimate, then the Soviet Union and Cuba are on
a collision course.
Alternatively, Cuba and the Soviets could be
partners in a system where the Soviets handle state-to-state affairs,
and Cuba handles the guerrillas.- Whichever the situation, Cuba is
maintaining a precarious position in the world by politically distancing
itself from the nation that supports it.

197. Shneyer, supra note 1, at 453 (Cuba obtains its oil at approximately one third of the
price on world markets).
198. ECONOMIST, vol. 312, Aug. 5, 1989, at 42.
199. Abrams, supra note 160 (This dependency will not cease in the future according to
Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Fernando Gil of the University of Pittsburgh. As former assistant
secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams noted, "Cuba remains a basket
case, and the U.S.S.R. is holding the basket.").
200. Abrams, supra note 160 (rationing that was supposed to be temporary at the inception
of the Communist government, has continued for the past thirty years).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (Soviet Union attempted to muscle Fidel Castro and it worked).
205. Id.
206. Id. (Since Castro has refused to implement these changes and has continued to export
revolution in Latin America, perhaps Fidel Castro considers Latin America to be the final place
from which to obtain economic aid.).
207. Id. The Soviet Union has stated that they have ceased sending arms shipments to
other Latin American countries. Id. Analysts attribute current Soviet arms received by Latin
American guerrillas to Cuban transshipment of Soviet arms intended to be used by the Cubans.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The potential economic benefits to the United States that could
accrue from a lifting of the trade embargo with Cuba are greatly
outweighed by the political impediments that currently exist. Violations of human rights permeate a society that has been compared to
the oppressive regime of Stalin. For over thirty years, Cubans have
been denied the basic human rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In addition, the Cuban government seeks to spread similar repressive regimes to countries throughout the world. Financing for these
insurgencies has been obtained in many instances through the illegal
trafficking of narcotics. If the United States were to lift the embargo
with Cuba, the ensuing trade would serve to subsidize the Cuban
export of revolution and terror so fervently opposed by the government of the United States.
The original purposes of the embargo were: (1) to prevent the
communist regime in Cuba from extending its influence in Latin
America by force; (2) to assist the Cuban people in reaching self-determination; and (3) to deter the creation of an externally supported
military capability that would endanger the United States. The United
States purposes, while not entirely fulfilled, have come closer to being
accomplished in light of recent international events. Socialist reforms
in Eastern Bloc countries have returned some level of autonomy to
its citizens.
The Soviet Union, Cuba's guardian, has been at the forefront of
these reforms. Yet Cuba remains adamant in its stance embracing
repressive policies. As a result, Cuba has become economically and
politically isolated. The United States should not lift the trade embargo
because the message to Cuba is clear: Perestroika or Perish.
Manuel A. Mesa
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